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1 The Knowledge Asymmetry in Time and Chance
1.1 Memories and Macroscopic Traces
Why is our knowledge of the past so much more ‘expansive’ (to pick a suitably vague term) than
our knowledge of the future? And intimately related, how can we capture the difference(s): i.e., in
what sense is knowledge of the past more ‘expansive’? As a first stab, one might be convinced by
the first four chapters of David Albert’s Time and Chance (2000; henceforth T&C – all quotations
are from this work unless otherwise stated) that the ‘Newtonian statistical mechanical contraption
for making inferences about the world’ (96) captures everything that can be inferred by statistical
mechanics at any time. Indeed, in this paper I will assume that it does. One might then reasonably
wonder whether it would even be possible to know anything that didn’t follow from the contraption
– so doing would apparently take more knowledge of the past than the past hypothesis (PH), or more
knowledge of the present state than its current macrocondition, or a more informative probability
distribution, and how could one obtain any of those? So one might suggest that:
A proposition can only be known if it is made likely by taking a uniform probability
over all states compatible with the current macrocondition of the universe, and with its
initial macrocondition, given the laws of mechanics.
Then, since the initial state is one of considerable ‘order’, given by the PH1, many more interesting
propositions about the past than about the future will satisfy the necessary condition .
Such a necessary condition can’t be the end of the story: it is asymmetric, permitting more
knowledge of the past than future, but it doesn’t make clear how we come to have any such
knowledge. For instance, it would be manifestly crazy to suggest that the condition describes how
we reason about other times, because clearly we have knowledge of other times without knowing
anything much about the nature of the early universe, and so presumably has humanity since before
the earliest creation myths. Our ability to reconstruct the past is not evidence of our knowledge of
the PH! But if it were a necessary condition (it’s not) then it could be a great help: having a decent
statement of the asymmetry surely aids explaining it! And it relies on the PH, so any satisfactory
account of the knowledge asymmetry must explain why; likely such an account will invoke the PH.
1Two points: first, the PH is not merely that the universe started with ‘low entropy’ (a claim that some say is
‘not even false’) but that it started in some, to be specified by the full PH, macrostate. Second, I will make the usual
assumption of an even probability function over microstates throughout this essay, often without further comment
for brevity.
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And in fact, the treatment of the knowledge asymmetry in T&C (Chapter Six), does proceed
in much this way. It places giving a clear description of the asymmetry forefront in the discussion,
as a prerequisite to an explanation, and so presents and defends a necessary condition along these
lines. However, the condition is significantly different in an important way that is not made terribly
clear in T&C: my main goal in the first half of this paper is to explain and clarify the difference
and say why it is so important. Also different is T&C’s argument for the condition, as I’ll explain
towards the end of this half; in the second half, with a clear account of the approach before us, I
will argue that it doesn’t succeed. While I have no positive account to offer in its place, I hope at
least to make some progress by illuminating some of the constraints on any proposed understanding
of the knowledge asymmetry. In particular, the focus of the paper is on getting straight(er) about
the physics of memory.
So, suppose the ‘ice pachinko’ of T&C (83) is run with a single ice cube in a sealed room with a
human observer watching, but making no record of events. The cube falls through the device and
randomly ends up in one of the beakers, the leftmost one say. Eventually, after the ice cube has
first melted and then evaporated, there will be no trace of which beaker it fell into remaining in
the macrostate of the universe: the water molecules will be randomly distributed in the air of the
room, whatever beaker the ice cube fell into. The macrocondition of the universe will be the same
whatever happened, and the initial macrostate of the universe surely won’t determine the outcome
(certainly it isn’t supposed to do that kind of work in T&C), so the contraption should assign equal
conditional probabilities for the ice having falling left or right – that it fell left is not knowable
according to our necessary condition.
That’s not to say that the microstate doesn’t contain the necessary information: if the evolution
is (backwards) deterministic, then the earlier state can be recovered from the microstate. But the
whole game here is to work with macrofacts – idealizing, we take those to be what’s knowable.
What about the fact that we can discover aspects of the microstate: perhaps there are insensible
mineral traces in the beaker that could be detected by chemical analysis? Such discoveries amount
to magnifying micro-differences to produce macro-differences: paradigmatically, by focussing a
microscope on something otherwise too small to see. But the proposed formula for the knowable
only takes into account the present macrocondition; that some aspect of the microstate could or
will be magnified into the macrostate, at a later time is irrelevant. The necessary condition says
that the outcome is knowable now only if it can be inferred using the macrostate now, and it is
beside the point to note that it could be satisfied if the macrostate were different, or even that it
will be satisfied by some future macrostate. It isn’t satisfied at the time in question.
But of course, that the ice cube fell in the leftmost beaker is perfectly knowable at that time – it
is already known by the observer! So the condition is not necessary, and it cannot help explain the
knowledge asymmetry. And neither does this example seem especially recherche´. Macrorecords are
being erased all the time, and the observer is relying on no strange procedures for obtain knowledge
– she’s just watching!
1.2 The ‘Presently Surveyable Condition’
As I said, the account just refuted is not that offered in T&C: instead of conditioning on the current
‘macrocondition’, T&C conditions on (what it terms elsewhere) the ‘presently surveyable condition’
of the world:
“. . . everything we know of the past and present and future history of the world can
be deduced . . . from the following four elements: what we know of the world’s present
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macrocondition – and of our own brains, perhaps; the standard microstatistical rule;
the dynamical equations of motion; the past hypothesis.” (119)
In fact, the ‘Newtonian contraption’ uses exactly these elements, not those in the condition I gave;
we can say for short that we can know something of the past or future if it is given a high probability
by the contraption. (Apologies for the earlier misdirection, which I found useful for setting things
up.)
So the difference is that we are also to condition somehow on the physical state of our brains.
Before I elaborate this crucial idea, I do want to emphasize that it is rather easy to overlook in
T&C. The passage quoted downplays its relevance; and it first appears with almost no comment or
explanation (96). The fullest discussion appears in a footnote: the surveyable condition includes
‘whatever (perhaps [microscopic]2) features of the present condition of the brain of the observer in
question may be accessible to her by means of direct introspection.’ (114) But, as we’re about to
see, if it isn’t obvious already, conditioning on the brain state in some way is essential in this project,
in order to address mnemonic knowledge; T&C is entirely right to require such conditioning.
The idea is that the pachinko observer’s knowledge satisfies this new condition: that her mem-
ories entail something about the microstate of her brain that, with the PH (and the rest of the
macrocondition), make it likely that the ice fell in the leftmost beaker. The previous example should
make clear why some such conditioning is absolutely necessary if we are to include memories of the
past in our treatment of the knowledge asymmetry – and surely one of the things we want to know
most is why we remember the past but not the future! ‘Direct introspection’ may be intended to
be more expansive, but in the case in hand all we need add to the surveyable condition are our
memories – or rather, since we will have to worry about their veracity, our putative memories.3 So
we include whatever follows for the physical state of the world (including its microstate) from the
fact that the pachinko observer has a (putative) memory of the ice cube falling into the leftmost
beaker.
By ‘putative’ I mean that all that’s relevant is the fact that the observer’s brain is in a state
compatible with her truly remembering the beaker; of course just being in that state is no guarantee
that the memory is veridical. Especially we must bear in mind that the background to this discussion
is the reversibility objection: if we accept that future entropy increase is overwhelmingly likely,
conditional only on the present surveyable state and the laws, then the symmetry of the laws implies
that the conditional probability for past entropy decrease is equally likely. So in this discussion we
need to entertain the possibility that instead of being veridical, putative memories are the result
of extremely improbable fluctutations in the microstate of the world. (Let’s bracket other sources
of false memories momentarily.) Of course, if one conditions on veridical memories then, by logic
rather than physics, it follows that the remembered events really happened. For example, that the
pachinko observer veridically remembers that the ice cube fell in the leftmost beaker, entails that it
did. But the reversibility objection shows that there can be nothing about the present microstate
of a brain with some memory that entails its veracity – at very least, the stimuli that eventually
produced the memory are most likely the product of random fluctuations, not the recalled event.
So if we want to play the usual game (that of T&C) of assuming about the present only that which
2The text reads ‘macroscopic’, which is obviously a typo; compare with (96).
3Here’s another reservation about the treatment of the brain state in T&C. Talk of ‘direct introspection’ carries
a suggestion of armchair psychology: it sounds as if what counts is ‘second order’ knowledge of what our putative
memories are. But the discussion should make clear that what actually matters is just the memories themselves –
not whether we also know we remember in some sense. I’m pretty sure David is aware of this, but for a while I was
confused by the language.
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could (in a very broad sense) be learned by inspection of the universe now, we can’t condition on
the truth of memories, only their existence. Put another way, to know that a memory is veridical
is to know something about the state of the past that doesn’t follow from the present state and
the laws, and including such information undermines T&C’s whole project of understanding time
asymmetries in terms of statistical mechanics. (Thus a note on terminology: the unmodified term
‘memory’ will now mean ‘putative memory’.)
So the necessary condition for knowledge is just as in the previous section, except that we
further condition on whatever follows for the state (micro or macro) of the world from the observer’s
putative memory of the ice cube falling in the leftmost beaker. The idea is that there are only two
explanations for the state of the brain on the table, random fluctuation or faithful recording process,
and the PH makes the latter far more likely. (As we’ll see, there is a significant problem here: what
exactly does a memory entail for the state of the brain? And does whatever it is actually imply
that these are the only possibilities?)
Assuming (against some critics) that the Newtonian contraption generally works as advertised,
it still might seem implausible that just conditioning on an appropriate brain state could be enough
to significantly raise the probability that the ice cube fell in a particular beaker. After all, there
are lots of ways in which such belief formation might go wrong – optical illusions, tricky magicians,
evil scientists, wishful thinking, forgetfulness and so on. But it’s worth noting that non-veridical
memories formed by such processes may not make their subjects likely, if such processes leave
other traces in the presently surveyable condition. To give a fanciful example, consider the group
of GIs ‘brainwashed’ to hold false memories about the heroic actions of Raymond Shaw, in the
Manchurian Candidate. Applying the laws to those memories (consistent with the PH), we assume
for now, makes the true past unlikely; conditioning on the states of their brains (and the PH) makes
it likely that Shaw was a hero. But whether or not he really was makes a difference to the present
surveyable condition – beyond those memories – in the memories of the Soviet observers, in records
kept by the North Koreans, in messages sent to conspirators in the US, and so on. If those traces
are present, and if the contraption is working, it ought to make the beliefs unlikely to be true, after
all. And more generally, it’s easy to imagine cases, like the pachinko observer, in which a veridical
memory is the only effect of an event on the presently surveyable condition: watching how a wave
breaks, or the milk spills, or where the first raindrop lands, and so on. But it is much harder to
imagine the formation of a non-veridical memory (given the PH) leaving no traces: conspiracies
require work, and work leaves traces. So it’s plausible that the Newtonian contraption is generally
good at assigning low probability to non-veridical memories – and in fact, it should be fairly obvious
that the kinds of remarks just made apply, not only to memories, but to any kind of traces of the
past.4 That said, such examples will not concern us further as we proceed.
1.3 Records and the PH
Now we that understand the necessary condition more clearly, we can turn to T&C’s argument for it.
The strategy is to give an idealized account of the methods by which knowledge of other times can
be had, thus obtaining (asymmetric) upper bounds on what can be known of past and future. One
method for obtaining such knowledge involves inferences from the laws and surveyable condition
4And what about a case in which the Newtonian contraption makes likely the subject of a false memory, because
traces of the deception have been erased? Would that be a counter-example to the proposals of T&C? No, because
ultimately the game is to balance our beliefs and theory so that our beliefs turn out to be likely true according to
the theory – and any program like that, since it is probabilistic, will end up making some false things true.
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(and standard measure) alone; that generally gets the future right, but of course is radically wrong
about the past. (T&C has a nice discussion of why this method doesn’t get the future quite right
either, and how to fix the problem [119-22] but we don’t need to take account of that here.)
The second method is that of record reading: comparing the current state of a system with its
state at another time (the ‘ready state’), to infer (using the dynamical laws and uniform probability)
the occurrence of an interaction in between the two times – at an earlier time than the present,
if the ready state occurred even earlier. To literally, to explicitly make such an inference requires
knowledge, not only of the current state, but of the ready state as well. Whether there is some other
non-literal, implicit procedure for obtaining knowledge from a record is the subject of the second
half of this paper. The argument of T&C, however, does invoke a procedure of literal inference
(without prejudice concerning the existence of other methods):
And the puzzle is about how it is that we ever manage to come by [information
about the ready state of a record bearing system]. It can’t be by means of retrodic-
tion/prediction . . . . It must be because we have a record of that other condition! But
how is it that the ready condition of this second device is established? And so on (ob-
viously) ad infinitum. There must be . . . something we can be in a position to assume
about some other time . . . the mother (as it were) of all ready conditions. And this
mother must be prior in time to everything of which we can potentially ever have a
record, which is to say it can be nothing other then the initial macrocondition of the
universe as a whole.
And so it turns out that precisely the thing that makes it the case that the second
law of thermodynamics is (statistically) true . . . is also the thing that makes it the case
that we can have epistemic access to the past which is not of a predictive/retrodictive
sort [i.e., the PH]. (T&C 117-8)
That is, T&C gives a regress argument to conclude that knowledge of the literal record reading kind
requires our assuming the PH. If so, the basis of knowledge of other times is the presently surveyable
condition, the PH and the laws: what we can know of other times is given by the consequences of
the Newtonian contraption, as T&C’s necessary condition says.
Ok . . . but then, since we do have non-retrodictive knowledge of the past, knowledge presumably
garnered from records, and could in almost complete ignorance of the PH, the regress just shows
that we aren’t just literal record readers. (Or perhaps we subconsciously know the PH, and are
literal record readers – so we need psychology not cosmology to discover the PH!)
I hope David will forgive me having a little fun here. Of course that’s not what’s intended – as
he’s pointed out repeatedly, you’d have to think him crazy to take the argument that way! Instead
we have to bear in mind that we are considering an idealized procedure, capable of capturing
anything knowable, not an account of how we know.5 That said, the passage perhaps invites
misinterpretation by speaking in the first person; perhaps it would be clearer if it asked how ‘an
idealized system’ that employed the method of literal record reading could come by information
about ready states.
A procedure that works that way is logically consistent, but there are a couple of important
points, which will feature prominently in the second half of the paper. First, since the regress
argument shows that literal record reading is not only the procedure by which we obtain knowledge
5It’s true that T&C doesn’t say this explicitly, but (a) the argument to sanity, and (b) the footnote on (116)
describing retrodiction in such terms, shows that is what’s intended.
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of the past, how do we? Until we have an answer to that question, the argument makes knowledge
of the past a bit of a paradox – the resolution is not difficult, but seeing clearly how we do use
records will advance the discussion. Second, taking the argument as I have just suggested reveals a
logical gap: since there must be other procedures, why think that literal record reading is maximal?
In other words, why think that T&C’s necessary condition holds?
Now, approaches to the knowledge asymmetry that appeal to the second law are familiar, and
T&C grounds the second law on the PH, so one might suspect that we have here an appeal to
entropy in understanding the knowledge asymmetry. (Especially since T&C contains another,
similar regress argument – the one involving the ice pachinko – to argue that the PH grounds
the second law.) But the argument is supposed to be a novel one, breaking from views which
assume that records are inevitably entropy increasing. First, such an assumption is not made in the
argument. But more importantly, as T&C points out, there is no way to connect its conception of a
record up with the second law: whether the final state is of higher or lower entropy than the ready
state, or before or after it, knowledge of the two states will generally allow one to infer something
about the intervening time. (Even knowledge that both states are equilibrium for a system allows
one to infer that nothing happened to the system in between!)
So things are set up for the final sections now. First, we saw that the kind of account of the
knowledge asymmetry developed in T&C must include our (putative) memories in the ‘currently
surveyable state’ – for there can readily be things we remember about the past that don’t leave any
traces in the present macrostate. Now we have seen how T&C characterizes knowledge of other
times that is not of the prediction/retrodiction sort – not in terms of the actual processes by which
we know the past, rather by reference to a hypothetical process of literal record reading. But how
do we actually know things about the past? In particular, how should we understand memory in
this framework? It seems to me that until we have thought about the actual processes it is not
obvious a priori that being knowable through hypothetical record reading is a necessary condition.
2 Memories Are Made of This
2.1 An Information Gathering and Utilizing System
One thing that may strike you in thinking about record readings is that when we remember, there’s
no consciousness of record reading going on at all: you don’t generally note that you have a memory,
and infer from that that something occurred – generally, part of a memory just is the belief that
its object occurred.6 So if we can get a handle on such mnemonic knowledge, perhaps that will give
us an ‘inference method’ quite different from literal record reading. Anyway, memories are both
central to the knowledge asymmetry, and in some way surely critical to our having knowledge of
the past. So they are a good topic to investigate. We’ll approach things with a simplified model
of the physical basis of our mnemonic knowledge, both as a test case for T&C in its own right,
but also under the assumption that it provides a reasonable model of our mnemonic knowledge. I
have in mind some version of Gell-Mann’s (1994) “information gathering and utilizing system”, or
IGUS.
In general terms, such a device has sensors capable of responding to its environment and devices
capable of affecting its environment: inputs and outputs broadly construed. The system takes
inputs from its environment (visual inputs, for example), processes the received information and
6Of course that’s not always true: it makes perfect sense to doubt a putative memory, and to think about what
might have caused it instead of its apparent object. But we’ll stick to the straight-forward cases here.
2 MEMORIES ARE MADE OF THIS 7
2
in Section II. It is simple enough to be easily analyzed, but
complex enough to suggest how realistic IGUSes distinguish
between past, present, and future. The four-dimensional de-
scription of this robot is discussed in Section III. There we
will see that the robot’s present is not a moment in space-
time. Rather, there is a present at each instant along the robot’s
world line consisting of its most recently acquired data about
its external environment. The approximate common notion of
‘now’ that could be utilized by a collection of nearby robots
moving slowly with respect to one another is also described.
Section IV describes the connection of present, past and
future with the thermodynamic arrow of time and the radia-
tion arrow of time. It seeks to answer the question, “Could
we construct a robot that would remember the future?” Sec-
tion V describes alternative organizations of a robot’s experi-
ence that are different from past, present, and future. These
are consistent with the four-dimensional laws of physics. But
the possibility of these alternative organizations shows that
past, present, and future are not consequences of these laws.
We speculate, however, that, as a consequence of the laws of
physics, the past, present, and future organization may offer
an evolutionary advantage over the other modes of organiza-
tion. This supports a conjecture that past, present, and fu-
ture may be a cognitive universal [5] for sufficiently localized
IGUSes.
II. A MODEL IGUS
Imagine constructing a robot which gathers and utilizes in-
formation in the following manner (Figure 1):
Information Gathering: The robot has n+1 memory locations
P0,P1, · · · ,Pn which we call ‘registers’ for short. These con-
tain a time series of images of its external environment as-
sembled as follows: At times separated by intervals !∗ the
image in register Pn is erased and replaced by the image in
Pn−1. Then the image in Pn−1 is erased and replaced by the
image in Pn−2, and so on. For the last step, the robot cap-
tures a new image of its external environment and stores it
in register P0. Thus, at any one time, the robot possesses
a coarse-grained image history of its environment extending
over a time (n+ 1)!∗. The most recent image is in P0; the
oldest is in Pn.
Information Utilization: The robot employs the information
in the registers P0,P1, · · · ,Pn to compute predictions about its
environment at times to the future of the data in P0 and direct
its behavior based upon these predictions. It does this in two
steps employing two different processes of computation:
• Schema: The robot’s memory stores a simplified model
of its environment containing, not all the information
in P0,P1, · · · ,Pn, but only those parts important for the
quantum mechanics in that framework. For the special features of history
in quantum mechanics see, e.g. [4].
FIG. 1: Information processing in a model robot. The information
flow in the robot described in the text is represented schematically
in this diagram. The internal workings of the robot are within the
dotted box; its external environment is without. Every proper time
interval !∗ the robot captures an image of its external environment.
In the example illustrated, this is of a stack of cards labeled a,b,c,
etc. whose top member changes from time to time. The captured im-
age is stored in register P0 which constitutes the robot’s present. Just
before the next capture the image is P3 is erased and images in P0, P1,
and P3 are shifted to the right making room for the new image in P0.
The registers P1, P2, and P3 therefore constitute the robot’s memory
of the past. At each capture, the robot forgets the image in register
P3. The robot uses the images in P0,P1,P2, and P3 in two processes
of computation: C (“conscious”) and U (“unconscious”). The pro-
cess U uses the data in all registers to update a simplified model or
schema of the external environment. That is used byC together with
the most recently acquired data in P0 to make predictions about its
environment to the future of the data in P0, make decisions, and direct
behavior accordingly. The robot may therefore be said to experience
(through C) the present in P0, predict the future, and remember the
past in P1,P2, and P3.
robot’s functioning. This model is called a schema [1].
Each time interval !∗, the robot updates its schemamak-
ing use of the information in P0 by a process of compu-
tation we denote byU .
The schema might contain the locations and trajecto-
ries of food, predators, obstacles to locomotion, fellow
robots, etc. It might contain hard-wired rules for suc-
cess (e.g. get food — yes, be food — no) and perhaps
even crude approximations to the rules of geometry and
the laws of physics (e.g. objects generally fall down).
It might contain summaries of regularities of the envi-
ronment abstracted from the information gathered long
before the period covered by registers P0, · · · ,Pn or ex-
plained to it by other robots, etc.3
• Decisions and Behavior: Each time interval !∗ the robot
uses its schema and the fresh image in P0 to assess
its situation, predict the future, and make decisions on
3 A history book is a familiar part of the schema of the collective IGUS
linked by human culture. It is a summary and analysis of records gathered
at diverse times and places. That is true whether the history is of human
actions or the scientific history of the universe. The schema resulting from
the reconstruction of present records simplifies the process of future pre-
diction. (For more on utility of history, see [4].)
From Hartle, “The Physics of Now”, 
http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0403001v2
Figure 1: Hartle’s ‘Information Gathering and Utilizing System’. At each time: inputs are shuffled
down the registers P0 − P3 (with the contents of the final register erased); the IGUS algorith-
mically generates a theory or ‘schema’ of the w rld based n the contents of the registers; and
it algorithmically determines how to act based on the contents of the ‘now’ register P0 and the
schema.
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stores it in its registers; that’s gathering. Then it has the capacity to operate algorithmically on
the contents of its registers and its current inputs to determine a course of action implemented
by its output devices (emit a beep or move away, for instance); that’s utilizing. Hartle’s (2008)
IGUS is shown in figure 1, though few details are significant for most of what follows. The one
simplifying assumption I will make is that the IGUS’s registers are in some special ‘empty’ ready
state before they are filled with gathered data; that assumption seems to be no restriction at all on
the computational power of IGUSs, and anyway I believe that the points I wish to make could be
made in a more complicated way without it. Clearly an IGUS can be realised as a digital computer,
though the intent is that an IGUS has greater autonomy than the typical personal computer. A
little more specifically, I want to consider an IGUS rather like us: especially responding to the same
kinds of features of the world that we do, drawing inductive inferences from them7, and drawing
on those inferences for action in the pursuit of specific goals. Below I shall say more about the
operation of the IGUS, specifically its algorithm.
Insofar as the system has reliable procedures for forming veridical memories, insofar as it draws
true inductive inferences, and insofar as its actions realise its goals on the basis of those inferences,
I say that the IGUS models an important aspect of our knowledge. Computationally it is relevantly
like us, and an IGUS could even be physically implemented like us. I trust it is clear enough
and uncontroversial enough why I say that. For now I want to focus specifically on its memories.
(‘Memory’ can be ambiguous between mnemonic knowledge and the registers of a Turing machine;
I will always use it in the former sense.)
An IGUS ‘remembers’ by reading the records stored in its registers, so let’s think about how that
might go. One might initially wonder whether an IGUS could remember by literally reading records:
explicitly deducing an intermediate event from knowledge of ready and later states of its registers.
But it’s easy to see that that would be a poor procedure to employ. Such an algorithm could form
representations of the current state of a register (perhaps the register is its own representation
in that regard), and also of the register’s ready state, and then compute a representation of the
cause of the difference. That third, derived, representation would then serve as a computational
input for any decision making processes related to the memory (perhaps to report that the IGUS
witnessed a particular event an hour ago). But what would the point of the computation be? A
more efficient algorithm would simply assign to the contents of the register whatever computational
role the derived representation plays in the algorithm discussed. See table 1 for a very simple
example of how such a routine would work.
That is, the states of the registers themselves are perfectly capable of playing the computational
role directly, without any interpretational process – the mnemonic knowledge is ‘immediate’. But
without some process such as I described, no explicit record reading of the kind considered in T&C
has occurred, because no role has been played by knowing, or assuming the ready state. Since the
algorithm employs no routine to deduce anything from representations of the present and ready
states of its registers, the record reading is implicit.
Previously I emphasized that we shouldn’t take T&C as giving a literal account of how we
read records of the past. The observation just made shows how we (or at least the IGUS that
models us) does it instead. In particular, the IGUS remembers without being subject to the record
regress; there is no question of the IGUS having to compute the ready state of its registers by some
reading some record of an earlier time, since the meaning of the registers’ contents is implicit in its
algorithm.8 The IGUS shows that there is no paradox about memories, since it remembers without
7For recent work on algorithmic inductive reasoning see Waltz and Buchanan (2009).
8And if you think about it, for much the same reasons, even an explicitly record reading IGUS needn’t explicitly
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P0 P1 C
? ! Yes
? No
Table 1: A (partial) machine table for Hartle’s IGUS, specifying what is to be inscribed in C given
the contents of P0 and P1. P1 contains records of inputs one cycle ago; suppose that if the IGUS
‘saw’ an exclamation mark then P1 will now contain a ‘!’, and otherwise be left empty. P0 contains
the current input; if the IGUS is asked whether it just witnessed an exclamation mark then suppose
it will contains a ‘?’. The output depends on the contents of C (for instance, the IGUS will say
‘yes’ if C contains yes): this IGUS answers veridically. The point is that this IGUS ‘remembers’
whether or not it saw a ‘!’ without computation involving explicit representations of the P1’s ready
and final states; the machine table depends directly on the present state.
knowing anything about the PH! Now, resolving the paradox doesn’t refute the position of T&C,
which is that the PH plays a novel role, separate from the second law, in explaining the knowledge
asymmetry – a conclusion argued for by a record regress argument. But now we’re absolutely clear
that the regress does not apply literally to memories, we should ask seriously whether it applies at
all. In the following sections I will use our IGUS to argue that it does not.
Before moving on, it’s probably worth justifying the claim that the IGUS ‘knows’ anything;
in what sense can we call the contents of the registers ‘knowledge’? It will suffice here to point
out that the IGUS can satisfy a wide range of behavioural criteria for knowing: actions depending
on the memories, production of representations of the memories, communicating the memories to
other IGUSs, for example. I do not mean to rely on a behaviouristic account of knowledge – these
are just evidence, not constitutive.
2.2 An IGUS Remembers
Since our IGUS doesn’t explicitly use record reading, we should now ask whether it can have
mnemonic knowledge that does not satisfy the necessary condition proposed in T&C – it doesn’t
suffer from the record regress, which is the argument for the condition. To answer this question we
have to say something more definite about the ‘presently surveyable condition’: what is entailed
for its microstate by its remembering some event? Well, assuming that the IGUS works something
like Hartle’s, depositing data representing particular inputs in identifiable registers, then a natural
suggestion is that the memory of an event entails that the relevant registers be in the appropriate
states. Let’s be much more generous than that: let’s include in the presently surveyable condition
the states of all the registers (and its ‘schema’ if you like, though for brevity I won’t explicitly).9 So
to make sure we haven’t left anything out of their physical description, let the surveyable condition
include the microstates of the registers.
Under these assumptions, however, the IGUS can have mnemonic knowledge that does not
satisfy the necessary condition for knowledge of the record reading type – T&C’s condition is
read any records of times before the ready state obtained. The regress doesn’t apply to it either! But our IGUS is more
natural, and since it doesn’t require any explicit record of the ready state, makes the point most straight-forwardly.
9If the IGUS is a universal Turing machine, then its algorithm will also be encoded in the registers. Include those
registers too; just remember that mere marks on a tape (or whatever) aren’t an algorithm, except in relation to some
specific machine, that acts on them in some specified ways. (I.e., one can’t infer a machine table from marks alone.)
In other words, even in a UTM there is a distinction between the physical states of the registers and the algorithm.
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not necessary. Just let the IGUS be the witness of the pachinko experiment discussed earlier, so
that there are no macrotraces of the outcome, only the inscriptions in its registers. How might
conditioning on these make the objects of the memories likely? Perhaps one can work backwards
from the records to determine their causes. But that won’t work, because any set of registers
and any contents are compatible with many machine tables and initial states; hence the process
by which the records were made cannot be determined. Nor does it help to also condition on
the microstate; many different Turing machines could be realized in conditions with registers in
identical microstates – the differences would lie in the physics of the rest of the device. In the
present case then, any physical realization of any computational state, is equally compatible with
the ice having fallen left or right (or any other possible event), so presumably conditioning on the
state of the registers makes each outcome equally likely. And this even though the IGUS has a
machine table along the lines of table 1, and the appropriate inscriptions, so that it does know in
which beaker the ice fell. (And once again, the circumstances in which the only records of an event
are in the brain are perfectly common: add to earlier examples of this kind of thing, remembering
the result of a coin toss, or the exact spot the ball bounced, or who ate the last pretzel.)
But these considerations also show that our guess about what memories entail for the physical
state of an IGUS is wrong. As we saw in the previous section, what register inscriptions mean,
what they are memories of, depends on their computational role in an IGUS; for instance, that is
what determines their effects on behavior. But of course the inscriptions in an IGUS’s registers – or
even their microstate – doesn’t determine their computational role, again because any registers and
contents are compatible with many Turing machines. So the surveyable condition under discussion is
compatible with many computational roles, and hence with the register inscriptions being memories
of many different things (and of nothing) – so we can’t have cashed it out right, and we must try
again.10
The next obvious thing to try is to include everything in the surveyable condition – the full mi-
crostate of the IGUS. A real, material IGUS is, computationally, nothing but a physical realization
of a Turing machine, with no magical processing powers; hence its machine table should supervene
on its physical state and the laws of physics. Hence we do not have the underdetermination problem
raised above; the surveyable condition of an IGUS, in the new account, is not compatible with mul-
tiple algorithms. But is T&C’s condition necessary with this new account? Are events remembered
by the IGUS likely according to the Newtonian contraption, conditioning on the macrostate of the
universe and the microstate of the IGUS (and laws and PH)? No.
Even though the machine table is now determined by the surveyable condition of the IGUS,
working backwards to the causes of the inscriptions still won’t work. Suppose we take the current
microstate, turn the nomic handle in reverse, and try to evolve things backwards to earlier times,
through changes to the registers, back to the states of the IGUS’s input devices when they were
triggered, to the stimuli they received, from which the causes of those stimuli – the recalled events
– are (let’s suppose) determinable.11 The backwards determinism of the laws means that a closed
system can be uniquely wound backwards from a given microstate (so there are no statistical
assumptions here). But of course that won’t help in this case because the IGUS is not a closed
system: its state is the result of its initial state and a sequence of inputs (and outputs), which are
10I’d like to thank some very bright students at Oberlin College for pushing me on this point.
11If the IGUS works as we do to build up a coherent ‘schema’, then it will have routines to infer more from its
inputs than is logically entailed by the raw physical stimuli by means of the laws. Various tricks and sleights of hand
reveal the operation of such routines – which presumably are generally reliable under normal conditions. Let’s shelve
this complication.
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nothing but interactions with the rest of the world (so the point holds even if the IGUS is otherwise
perfectly screened off). Without those boundary conditions the laws do not determine the earlier
states, but they are not fixed by the surveyable condition (nor could they be, without begging
the question). Computationally the point is that, for many Turing machines, a given state of the
registers can be compatible with many initial states and sequences of inputs.
(And note that there is no reason at all to think that conditioning on the PH will make some
particular past history more likely: only if the PH alone entailed which of the possible stimuli
were received would the problem now be soluble; but that would be tantamount to the PH alone
entailing the causes of the stimuli, which is just the remembered past history. And no one thinks
the PH does that!)
Given this new underdetermination, one might wonder how the IGUS manages to read the
records in its registers, apparently beating physics! But there’s no real puzzle: although the IGUS
doesn’t explicitly condition on the registers’ ready state, it does do so implicitly. Consider, for
instance, table 1: there we just supposed that the correct inscriptions would end up in P1. But
suppose, for instance, that the mechanism for inscribing the contents of P1 assumes that it is initially
empty; if instead P1 starts with an inscribed ‘!’ then the IGUS will end up saying ‘yes’ even if it did
not see an exclamation mark. In other words, the IGUS’s algorithm implicitly assumes an initial
state for its registers for its proper functioning, and so is not merely conditioning on its current
condition.
Now, there are Turing machines for which given initial and final states are compatible with
many sequences of inputs, but a device with a machine table like that could not reliably recall the
events that led to such underdetermined inscriptions. Suppose, for instance, that there are two
possible inputs compatible with a given inscription and initial state. The computational role of the
inscription could be that of a memory of one of the inputs, so that it functioned just like an IGUS
memory of a specific event. But the underdetermination of the inscription’s cause means that the
device’s algorithm cannot reliably determine which input produced it, so which input is apparently
remembered is arbitrary. Under these conditions, even if the apparent memory of the device was,
by chance, of the inscription’s actual cause, we would not say that the device knew it, exactly
because of arbitrary nature of the putative memory. In other words, an IGUS that models memory
satisfactorily will not have a machine table of this sort; instead, it will have an algorithm such that
the initial and current states of its registers are uniquely compatible with a series of inputs.
This new constraint on our IGUS’s algorithm of course also constrains its physical constitution:
it realize such a procedure. So, given this additional piece of information about the IGUS, will the
current microstate in conjunction with backwards deterministic laws now entail the stimuli received
by the receptors? (And hence, if everything works out, entail a high probability for their causes.)
Of course not. There are algorithms for which the current and initial states determine the series
of inputs, but for which the current state alone does not. Thus using the laws to time-reverse the
evolution from the microstate of a physical realization of such an IGUS need not entail the prior
inputs, let alone the stimuli that caused them. (In some particular realization it might, but the
question is whether the necessary condition captures what is knowable in principle.) And this, even
when the contents of the registers were properly formed and have the appropriate computational
roles to entail that the IGUS knows that the events that caused them indeed occurred. So expanding
the surveyable condition and constraining IGUS’s machine tables is not enough to ensure that when
an IGUS has a memory, evolving the state backwards will make the object of the memory likely.
(And as before, the PH does not fix the problem.)
Some may be tempted to say that the ‘memories’ of an IGUS of this kind aren’t really knowledge
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either – after all, with respect to the different possible initial states, the inputs are ‘arbitrary’. But
they are not arbitrary for the IGUS; after all, its algorithm relies for its proper functioning on
the existence of some special initial condition, given which, we demand, the series of inputs is
determined. So the underdetermination is crucially different from the previous one: if the initial
and final states do not determine the series of inputs, then only chance can make apparent memories
veridical; if the initial and final states do determine the inputs, then the memories will be reliable
on the condition that the IGUS was indeed in the appropriate initial state. In the latter case, and
only in that case, is it possible for the IGUS to work properly!12 In my opinion the memories of
such an IGUS constitute knowledge for it. To deny that, because it might have been in a different
initial state than that it was (and so misread the registers) has the same logic as denying that I
know anything from experience, even in the case that the experiences are properly produced by
their objects, just because identical experiences could also have been caused by an evil demon. I
know that some do adopt such positions, but it would be at least unfortunate if one were forced
to in order to defend the view of T&C. I would especially note that one would reasonably expect
there to be considerable computational efficiencies to be had by our kind of IGUS over one whose
current state alone determined the sequence of inputs. Hence it is plausible that evolution made us
along the lines of our kind of IGUS, and hence any argument that it doesn’t have knowledge of the
past plausibly applies to us as well – some might accept that conclusion, but it seems a high price
to pay.
Let’s put such skepticism aside then, and take it that an IGUS can have knowledge of the past
even though the conjunction of its algorithm and current computational state doesn’t determine its
sequence of inputs (though the additional conjunction with the initial computational state does).
Then there is nothing in principle preventing the construction of such a device for which the same
is true of the laws governing it and its microstate: they don’t determine the sequence of inputs
(although in conjunction with the initial microstate they do) – even though the events that caused
those inputs are known to the IGUS. And when those events are like the outcome of the ice
pachinko experiments, so that conditioning on the macrostate of the universe doesn’t make them
probable either, then the full Newtonian contraption fails to make them probable, even though
they are perfectly well known to the IGUS – showing that we can know more of the past than the
contraption allows.
Note that conditioning on the PH makes it unlikely that the IGUS and its current state is the
result of a fluctuation from equilibrium, but the PH does not make it probable that the IGUS’s
memory is veridical, because that further requires that the IGUS started in the correct initial
computational state, out of all the many possibilities. The kind of macroscopic information that
the PH provides about the very distant past cannot – as far as I can see – make that likely.13
12Of course I’m making the usual background assumption that the IGUS is constructed so the computational roles
of the inscriptions are commensurate with the inputs they record; the point is just that such a thing is possible
because, given the appropriate initial state, the inscription is unequivocal about its cause.
13David has put it to me that the contraption will assign a high probability to any IGUS one finds being the
product (direct or indirect) of natural selection. He further argues, I take it, that selection produces fit systems,
so it is thus also likely that any IGUS has veridical memories; hence the contraption must, after all, assign a high
probability to the correct IGUS initial state and the objects of its memories. I have two main responses. First, not
all IGUSes are reliable (indeed, some IGUSes have veridical memories of the unreliability of others, and one can
envision situations in which only unreliable IGUSes survive some cataclysm): in short, a blanket appeal to natural
selection threatens to include too many mnemonic systems as reliable. Second, I think David has the view that if the
contraption doesn’t make our memories likely veridical, then we should doubt them, and fall into skepticism. But
that worry is misplaced if our memories do exceed the reach of the contraption, as I have argued. For in that case
the contraption simply fails to condition on all the relevant information: on the PH and the presently surveyable
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Nor can there be some way ‘better’ way to calculate the probabilities, in which they turn out to
be different, since the approach here already conditions on everything available to the contraption:
it doesn’t condition on anything but the PH, the surveyable condition and the laws, and all of those
were considered. Since probabilities are unequivocal, any calculation that conditions on the same
things must produce the same result. For instance, one might have entertained the following idea:
the IGUS’s microstate determines its machine table and the states of its registers, so it determines
their computational roles, and so, we have supposed, their intensional contents – what they are
memories of. But shouldn’t the IGUS remembering X imply that X is likely (given the PH); and
since the IGUS is physical, the probabilities must be physical, so surely those of the Newtonian
contraption? But that, we have just seen, is wrong – recalled events need not have high conditional
probabilities. (Of course one could modify the PH to include more information about the initial
microstate; since the underlying laws are deterministic, conditioning on enough initial information
will entail anything you like about later states. But the claim that the contraption with some
hypothesis or other about the past assigns correct probabilities is, given determinism, empirically
irrefutable: it is considerably weaker, and less interesting than the claim of T&C.14)
The issue we are touching on here is how to understand the physical basis of intensionality in a
way that connects beliefs up to their physical causes. It isn’t one in which I have any confidence
in my intuitions, so I don’t really understand how such a calculation would actually proceed – how
to present it other than in the sort of hand-waving way I just did. But I will make the following
observations: as we have now seen at length, in the IGUS model, its current microstate determines
the content of its memories, but their objects need not have high probabilities conditioned on the
microstate. So if we think that the object of a memory ought to have a high physical probability,
then that must require conditioning on something more, some physical background assumption.
I suppose that one could further condition on the IGUS’s memories being likely true (our recent
discussion of course shows that doesn’t necessarily follow from the surveyable state), but that
doesn’t seem very illuminating. Another alternative is to also condition on the initial microstate
of the IGUS; that would at least determine the sequence of inputs, so perhaps could determine
something about the stimuli that produced them, and so on.
But the bottom line is that an IGUS’s knowledge of the past is not constrained by the necessary
condition, and so its subjective probabilities need not agree with the probabilities of the Newtonian
contraption.
2.3 Final Thoughts
You may have noticed that this paper has not addressed the knowledge asymmetry directly; instead
the focus has been on how we read records. Of course it’s a short step to the asymmetry, for it
apparently lies in the existence of readable records of the past but not of the future. None of
my remarks are intended to express skepticism that the PH is relevant to the explanation of the
knowledge asymmetry, perhaps even in ways separate from its role in the second law. For instance,
brains and computers we know how to build are highly time directed systems: synapses aren’t
time-reversable, and neither are logic gates. The processes in these systems are governed by cause
and effect, so perhaps the arrow of causation lies at the heart of the knowledge asymmetry – and
state, but not on our memories. These points are not knock-down arguments against the natural selection argument,
but show that it requires considerable articulation and independent argument. (This conclusion is weaker than than
that in main text because it was added at the editorial stage, after David had written his response to the stronger
statements.)
14This comment was added after David had the chance to respond.
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the PH at the heart of the causal asymmetry? (This problem is related to the difficulty of building
an IGUS with memories of the future – if future events can’t influence it now, it seems the maker
just has to fill the registers himself!)
Hartle suggests that his IGUS (figure 1) is time asymmetric because its operation involves
erasing data from the final register, and because the permanent loss of such information is entropy
increasing; thus the system can only work in one temporal direction in virtue of the second law.
I’d like to point out that this proposal can’t be right as stated: for instance, in his IGUS the
final register remains empty until the fourth cycle, so it isn’t erased for that initial period. So
he hasn’t explained the knowledge asymmetry until that time; by his lights, nothing rules out a
suitable IGUS from remembering the future until all its last register was inscribed, and erasing had
to commence! To apply Hartle’s idea, some more general argument about the necessity of erasing
would be required. For instance, doesn’t shuffling the records down the registers involve erasing?
But that’s not an essential feature. Suppose, for example, that the registers are buckets and data
are stored by placing given numbers of balls in them: shuffling could be carried out by tipping the
balls from one bucket to the next. The sequence of records inscribed by the IGUS’s detectors can
easily be inferred from the collection of registers (by subtraction, of course). The problem is that
this or that part of the IGUS can be constructed without erasing, so something quite general about
the physical implementation of Turing machines would be needed to pursue Hartle’s strategy.
One final observation. Consider knowledge of the past that we draw from records other than
memories. Clearly we do read records in the way described in T&C all the time: the footprints in
the snow, the dent in the bumper, the puddle in the street. We know what they signify because
we infer what caused the changes from a ‘ready state’, even if we don’t remember the causes –
and even when we have no memory of the ready states (perhaps I’ve never been down this street
before). Does a record regress still threaten here? No.
We can easily imagine an IGUS that can read the records because it posses generalizations
about the ready states of systems, generalizations that it obtains by induction on the contents of its
memories. (It’s for this reason that I gave it inductive powers when I introduced it.) Significantly,
true generalizations, if informative at all, are often more informative about origins than fates: all
acorns start much the same, as do all sandy beaches as the receding tide exposes them, and all
rocks – at least compared to the countless ways in which acorns can develop or not into oaks,
the different kinds of impressions that can be made on beaches, and the different kinds of marks,
including those made by humans, that might be found on a rock. And similarly for freshly fallen
snow, bumpers and streets. (This point is emphasized by Lockwood, 2005, Chapter 11.) That is to
say there are such records of the past because one can infer an earlier ready state simply from the
kind of system involved; but that there are no corresponding records of the future, because there
are no generic later states for a given kind of system. Thus, we would have an explanation of the
knowledge asymmetry for the inferred (rather than remembered past), if we could only characterize
and explain this initial-final state asymmetry!
I won’t address that here, but note that we finally have a model of our knowledge of other times.
There are memories, modeled by the IGUS, in which the meaning of records is determined by their
computational role. Using these, and a capacity for induction, we can learn to read other records
for what they tell us of the past. This model allows a response to T&C’s objection (119) that the
brain’s ready state can’t be the ‘mother’ of all ready conditions: that memories are defeasible by
external records. There’s nothing odd about that in the present model, we simply have a set of
conflicting beliefs: some memories and some concerning current experiences, and some inductive
beliefs, which generalize other memories. Something has to give, and whether it is a specific memory
2 MEMORIES ARE MADE OF THIS 15
or a generalization is going to depend on our determination to hold onto the different beliefs.
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